In this paper, we investigate the limitations of capacity-based random code constructions for the wiretap channel, i.e., constructions that associate to each confidential message a subcode whose rate approaches the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. Generalizing a previous result for binary symmetric channels, we show that random capacity-based codes do not achieve the strong secrecy capacity over the symmetric discrete memoryless channels they were designed for. However, we also show that these codes can achieve strong secrecy rates provided they are used over degraded wiretap channels.
INTRODUCTION
In most communication schemes, coding at the physical layer is merely performed to ensure reliability; however, seminal results obtained by Wyner and Csiszár & Körner for the wiretap channel [1, 2] have shown the existence of coding schemes that can simultaneously guarantee reliability and secrecy against passive eavesdroppers. In addition, the secrecy of such schemes is measured quantitatively in terms of statistical independence. Specifically, if the random variable M represents the transmitted message, X n represents the encoded message and Z n represents the observation of an eavesdropper, perfect secrecy is achieved if M and Z n are independent or, equivalently, I(M; Z n ) = 0. Exact statistical independence is unfortunately too stringent to be amenable to further analysis; therefore, as originally suggested by Wyner, it is convenient to relax the constraint and to require asymptotic statistical independence in the limit of large encoding length n. Two measures of asymptotic statistical independence have been commonly used:
-weak secrecy, which requires limn→∞ It has been shown that the maximum rate of secure and reliable communication over a wiretap channel is the same irrespective of the metric used [3] ; however, this does not imply that a specific code achieving weak secrecy achieves strong secrecy. With the exception of [4, 5] , most code constructions based on polar codes [6, 7, 8, 9] or LDPC codes [10] proposed thus far have been proved to achieve weak secrecy only and whether they achieve strong secrecy remains an open question. A closer look at the latter constructions reveals that secrecy is obtained by associating to each confidential message a subcode whose rate approaches the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel; hence we call such codes capacity-based wiretap codes.
In this paper, we highlight the potential limitations of capacity-based wiretap codes by showing that random capacitybased wiretap codes that achieve the weak secrecy capacity for symmetric discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) cannot achieve the strong secrecy capacity. This result is a generalization of that obtained in [11] for binary symmetric channels. The proof follows the same reasoning as [11] , but we reproduce it here in full for the sake of completeness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and channel model considered in the paper. Section 3 summarizes known techniques to show the achievability of secure rates and highlights how capacitybased codes guarantee secrecy. Section 4 forms the core of the paper and proves that random capacity-based wiretap codes cannot achieve the strong secrecy capacity of symmetric DMCs. The special case where the channel of the legitimate receiver is error-free is also examined. Moreover, it is shown that capacity-based codes can achieve strong secrecy rates provided they are used over degraded wiretap channels. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks and perspectives.
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
We briefly detail the notation used in the paper. The notation log always stands for the logarithm in base 2. For random variables X, Y, H(X) denotes the entropy of X, and I(X; Y) the mutual information between X and Y. For probability distributions p, q, D(p q) and V(p, q) denote respectively the Kullback-Leibler divergence and L 1 variational distance of p and q.
Given a proposition P, we define
Wiretap channel
We consider the wiretap channel WT(W b , We) illustrated in Figure 1 , which consists of two symmetric DMCs: the channel from X to Y of the legitimate receiver with transition probabilities W b = p Y|X and capacity C b , and the channel from X to Z of the eavesdropper, with transition probabilities We = p Z|X and capacity Ce. The alphabets X , Y, Z are assumed to be finite. The notion of symmetric channel used in the paper and its properties are detailed in Section 2.3.
nR , an auxiliary message set M n = 1, 2 nR , an encoding function fn : Mn×M n → X n , and a decoding function (for the legitimate receiver) gn : Y n → Mn × M n . M denotes the confidential message, and M the auxiliary message, X n is the transmitted codeword and Y n , Z n are the corresponding outputs of the channels W b and We. (M,M ) = gn(Y n ) is the estimate of the legitimate receiver.
The messages M and M are assumed to be uniformly distributed in their respective sets. The reliability of a wiretap code is measured in terms of the average probability of error
while its secrecy is measured in terms of the information leaked to the eavesdropper L(Cn) I(M; Z n |Cn).
Definition (Capacity-based and resolvability-based codes). A sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} n≥1 is called capacity-based if
and if ∀n > 0 there exists a decoding function hn : Z n × Mn → M n . We denote byM = hn(Z n , M) the corresponding estimate. If on the contrary R > Ce for large n, we say that the sequence of codes is resolvability-based.
The reliability of a capacity-based wiretap code is measured with the modified average probability of error
Definition (Achievable secrecy rates). A rate R is an achievable weak secrecy rate if there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} n≥1 of rate R such that
Similarly, a rate R is an achievable strong secrecy rate if there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} n≥1 of rate R such that
The rate R is an achievable (strong or weak) secrecy rate with capacity-based wiretap codes if the same conditions hold upon replacing Pe by P * e . The weak (resp. strong) secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum of achievable weak (resp. strong) secrecy rates.
Properties of symmetric channels
In this paper we focus on the case where W b and We are symmetric DMCs. Several notions of channel symmetry have been proposed in the literature [12] . For instance, the following definition was given by Cover and Thomas [13] . Recall that the transition matrix of a channel
Definition (CT-symmetric). A DMC W is CT-symmetric if every row of the transition matrix M is a permutation of every other row, and all the column sums are equal.
This condition is too restrictive for us, for it does not include the binary erasure channel, one of the few examples of channels for which explicit wiretap codes achieving both weak and strong secrecy have been constructed [4, 5, 6, 14] . We will thus adopt the following alternative condition proposed by Gallager [15] :
Definition (G-symmetric). A DMC W with input X and output Z is G-symmetric if Z can be partitioned into subsets in such a way that, for every subset, the corresponding submatrix of transition probabilities has the property that each row is a permutation of each other row and each column is a permutation of each other column. That is, there exists a partition Z = Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ Zr into disjoint sets such that:
• ∀a,ā ∈ X , there exists a permutation πaā : Z → Z such that ∀k ∈ 1, r , πaā(Z k ) = Z k , and
• ∀k ∈ 1, r , ∀b,b ∈ Z k , there exists a permutation π bb :
Remark 1. Even though the output distribution q Z corresponding to the uniform input distribution q X is not necessarily uniform for G-symmetric channels, it turns out that it is locally uniform on each set Z k , k = 1, . . . , r of the partition [15] :
This property follows easily from the fact that the columns are permutations of each other:
Consequently, the capacity
Proof. We have
We can write
ACHIEVING SECRECY: CAPACITY VS. RESOLVABILITY
In this section, we prove that random capacity-based wiretap codes achieve weak secrecy capacity and show that random resolvability-based wiretap codes achieve strong secrecy. Strictly speaking, these proofs have already appeared in various forms [1, 16, 17, 18] , and we reproduce them to highlight the fundamental differences between the two constructions.
In both situations, we start with a random capacity-based code Cn, whose 2 n(R+R ) codeword symbols are generated independently according to a distribution q X on X . The codewords are labeled c(m, m ) with m ∈ 1, 2 nR and m ∈ 1, 2 nR . Let q Z be the output distribution of the eavesdropper's channel corresponding to the input q X , defined as
and q Z n the product of n i.i.d. copies of this output distribution:
Lemma 1 (Secrecy from capacity). Let Cn denote the random variable representing the randomly generated code. Let n > 0 be such that limn→∞ n = 0 but limn→∞ √ n n = ∞. Then, for n sufficiently large, there exists α > β > 0 such that
Proof. The fact that the conditions R + R < I(X; Y) and R < I(X; Z) imply E Cn {P * e (Cn)} ≤ 2 −αn for some α > 0 follows from standard large deviation techniques, see for instance [19] . Next, notice that
Here (a) follows from the fact that I(X n ; Z n |Cn) < I(X n ; Z n ), and that I(M; Z n |X n , Cn) = 0 because M → X n → Z n is a Markov chain; (b) follows from Fano's inequality and (c) holds for some β ∈ (0, α) and n sufficiently large.
Note that the speed at which E Cn {L(Cn)} decays is tightly related to the speed at which one can approach the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel I(X; Z). Unfortunately, large deviation techniques cannot circumvent the condition limn→∞ √ n n = ∞.
Instead of using capacity-based wiretap codes, one may use resolvability-based wiretap codes, in which case the analysis of secrecy relies on the following lemma [20] .
Lemma 2 (Cloud mixing). If the random codebook size is 2 nR withR > I(X; Z), then ∃β > 0 such that
where the expectation is computed over the random code ensemble.
Lemma 3 (Secrecy from resolvability). Let Cn denote the random variable representing the randomly generated code. Then, for n sufficiently large, there exists α > γ > 0 such that
Proof. The first part follows from the same arguments as in Lemma 1.
The second part follows by noting that
where (a) follows by symmetry of the random code construction and (b) follows from Lemma 2. Then, Lemma 1 in [21] guarantees that there exists γ > 0 such that
Note that the condition R > I(X; Z) allows us to establish strong secrecy directly. Naturally, one can wonder whether our inability to prove strong secrecy in Lemma 1 is fundamentally linked to the use of capacity-based codes, or whether this is simply a limitation of the proof. In the following section, we show that random capacity-based wiretap codes cannot achieve the strong secrecy capacity, which suggests that such constructions are less powerful than resolvability-based ones.
CAPACITY-BASED RANDOM CODES DO NOT ACHIEVE THE STRONG SECRECY CAPACITY
We consider a random capacity-based code Cn whose codewords are generated independently according to the uniform distribution q X on X . To simplify notation, we denote by p X n = p X n |Cn the uniform distribution on the codewords of Cn, and p Z n = p Z n |Cn the corresponding output distribution of the eavesdropper's channel. Note that, in general, the components of p Z n are not i.i.d. The following Proposition generalizes the result of Lemma 3 in [11] obtained for the case of binary symmetric channels: Proposition 1. Let {Cn} ≥1 be a sequence of (2 nR , 2 nR , n) capacity-based codes for the wiretap channel WT(W b , We) obtained by generating codeword symbols independently according to the uniform distribution q X on X , and such that R + R < C b , the channel capacity of the legitimate receiver. Then there exist α > 0, η > 0 such that ∀κ > 0,
for some function fκ : [22] (Theorem 6 and proof of Theorem 7) showed that ∀b > 0,
where E(Cn) = P M = M , and
Clearly P * e (Cn) ≥ E(Cn). From Pinsker's inequality, we get
Since X n is uniform on the code, p X n (X n ) = 1 |Cn| = 1 2 n(R+R ) = 1 |Mn|2 n(Ce −εn) . Therefore we can write
Estimate of P(A + n ). The set A + n can be rewritten as
By the law of total probability,
We can estimate the divergence as follows:
Recall that the entropy is continuous with respect to the variational distance (Lemma 2.7 in [23] ): if two probability distributions p,q on X satisfy V(p, q) ≤ , then
Since the rate of the random code is R + R = R + Ce − εn > Ce = I(X; Z) for n large enough, Lemma 2 holds. Markov's inequality implies that for β < α,
for some α > 0, for n large enough. So with probability greater than 1 − 2 −α n , the first term can be bounded by
The second term in the expression of the divergence is in turn bounded by
where µ Z = min z∈Supp(q Z ) q Z (z). Thus, from (5) and (6) we conclude that
for some C > 0. We still need to show that
also vanishes, where ϕ(n) = 2b √ n + n(Ce − εn). For a fixed realization Cn = {c(1), . . . , c(|Cn|)} of the code, this can be written as the weighted sum over the codewords:
. Let x,x ∈ X : from the property (1) in the definition of G-symmetric channel and from Remark 1, we have
Since the πxx : Z → Z are permutations, all the terms in the sum over the codewords coincide and are equal to
where Zi is the random variable corresponding to the output of the eavesdropper's channel for a fixed input equal tox. Since the channel is memoryless, the Zi, i ∈ 1, n , are independent and identically distributed and the random variables
are also i.i.d. with common pdf p E . Moreover, Remark 2 implies that E {p E } = Ce, the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. Denote by σ 2 the variance of E, and by ρ its third moment. Observe that σ > 0 and ρ < ∞. Then the Berry-Esseen theorem implies that ∃c > 0 such that ∀x,
If we choose x = 2b σ − √ nεn σ , we get
and
Estimate of P(A − ). We estimate the measure of A − in a similar manner to A + . First we rewrite A − as
By the Inclusion-Exclusion principle,
Berry-Esseen's theorem with
Thus
Estimate of P(An). Putting together the estimates of P(A + ) and P(A − ), we can conclude that ∀b > 0, with probability
for some constant C > 0. Then from (3) we get
with limn→∞ f (b, n) = 0. Lemma 1 implies that with probability tending to 1 exponentially fast, P *
Case of error-free legitimate channel
If the legitimate channel W b is the identity channel I, the code Un consisting of all the possible codewords of length n taken with equal probability always guarantees reliable communication for the legitimate receiver. If each confidential message is associated to a subcode approaching the capacity Ce of the eavesdropper's channel, the sequence {Un} n≥1 is a capacity-based code sequence that achieves the weak secrecy capacity. However, a similar result to Proposition 1 still holds in this case. This result has already been proved in [6] with a slightly different approach.
Lemma 4.
Suppose that the sequence of codes {Un} n≥1 achieves the weak secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel WT(I, We). Then, ∃η > 0 such that
and so it cannot achieve the strong secrecy capacity.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma is a special case of the proof of Proposition 1. In this case,
|X | n is the uniform distribution. Similarly to equation (4), we can write
Similarly to equations (7) and (8), after applying BerryEsseen's theorem we find
Therefore, ∀b > 0,
The thesis then follows from (3) since P * e (Un) → 0 (by a similar reasoning to Lemma 1).
Achieving strong secrecy by transmitting beyond the eavesdropper's channel capacity
The result of Proposition 1 is rather disappointing, since it shows that capacity-based random codes designed for a symmetric wiretap channel WT(W b , We) fail to achieve strong secrecy rates over this channel. The good news is that strong secrecy is achievable on all symmetric channels WT(W b , W e ) such that the new eavesdropper's channel W e has smaller capacity than We.
Lemma 5. Let {Cn} n≥1 be a sequence of random capacitybased codes for the symmetric discrete memoryless wiretap channel WT(W b , We), and let W e be a symmetric DMC with capacity C e < Ce. Then there exists α > 0 such that with probability greater than 1 − 2 −αn , {Cn} n≥1 achieves strong secrecy rates on WT(W b , W e ).
The proof follows the same reasoning as Lemma 3.
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we have generalized a previous result by Bloch [11] for the binary symmetric wiretap channel to all symmetric discrete memoryless wiretap channels, showing that capacity-based code constructions that achieve weak secrecy are suboptimal from the point of view of the strong secrecy metric, and that in particular they cannot achieve the strong secrecy capacity. Up to now, we have focused on the limitations of capacity-based random codes. It is natural to wonder whether structured capacity-based codes, such as polar codes for the binary symmetric wiretap channel [6] or the capacity-based LDPC codes for the binary erasure wiretap channel in [14] , share the same drawbacks or not. Indeed, in the case where the channel of the legitimate receiver is noiseless, we can already answer affirmatively to this question.
